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INTRODUCTION

I

n this essay I will first present some questions for discussion relating to the
threshold for the existence of an armed conflict between two or more States.
In particular, I will explore the main arguments for and against the “first
shot” approach in relation to the existence of an international armed conflict
and pose the question whether applicability of a particular provision or customary rule of international humanitarian law (IHL, a.k.a. the law of armed
conflict/LOAC) to a specific factual situation is or should be synonymous
with the existence of an armed conflict to which the entire corpus of IHL
relating to international armed conflicts becomes applicable.
In that context I will discuss some of the aspects of the relationship between the law governing the use of force in international relations, also referred to as the jus ad bellum and the law of armed conflict. I will present some
arguments as to why I think there are persuasive reasons for distinguishing
between the application of a particular rule of IHL when the situation requires it and acceptance of the proposition that any clash between the armed
forces of a State, no matter how brief or inconsequential, or the non-consensual presence of the armed forces of a State on the territory of another
State, results in the existence of an armed conflict between those States triggering, in principle, the full applicability of the law of armed conflict.
Finally, I will briefly discuss the application of IHL in the context of noninternational armed conflict, including a few words on the International
Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) “support-based approach” (SBA),
which is meant to apply to situations involving multinational forces operating in support of a government. As this piece is meant to serve as a catalyst
for discussion on a number of doctrinal issues, it will not deal with specific
factual examples of armed clashes and conflicts in any detail, nor will I attempt to provide a review of or comment on the relevant literature relating
to conflict thresholds and classification. Instead, it is my intention to provide
some food for thought and fuel for further discussion of these issues in the
context of exploring the grey areas or “twilight zone” of the humanitarian
law of armed conflict.
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II. THE ICRC “FIRST SHOT” THRESHOLD FOR INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION
USE OF FORCE INTENSITY CRITERION COMPARED
It is generally accepted that the Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols do not provide a clear definition of armed conflict or more than a
rough indication of when an armed conflict can be said to have begun. Common Article 2 gives some indication, but aside from reference to “declared
war or other armed conflict” and adding that the conventions apply in cases
of occupation of territory even if such occupation meets with no resistance,
there is little in the way of explanation of what the conditions for armed
conflict are and when a conflict can be said to have begun. 1 In view of the
reference to application of the conventions to situations of occupation, the
question also can be asked whether applicability of the conventions is necessarily the same thing as the existence of an armed conflict. In the famous
Tadić decision of 1995 the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provided the closest thing we have to a
definition of an armed conflict. The Tribunal stated, “we find that an armed
conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a State.” 2 That is a low threshold that corresponds to Jean Pictet’s 1952 commentary to Common Article
2 of the Geneva Conventions:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention
of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even
if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no
difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.
The respect due to human personality is not measured by the number of
victims. 3

1. See, e.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
2. Prosecutor vs. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995).
3. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (Jean Pictet
ed., 1952) (footnote omitted).
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From this perspective any situation resulting in an armed confrontation is
automatically an armed conflict. The underlying rationale, which is evident
from his words, is the need to ensure protection to persons adversely affected by an armed conflict regardless of the intensity, duration, or scope
thereof. The more recent ICRC commentary of 2016 extends this approach
to include any non-consensual presence of the armed forces of one State on
the territory of another, even in the absence of any armed clash or situation
of occupation. 4 This extension of the low threshold approach makes a mere
violation of territorial sovereignty by State agents an international armed
conflict, even if they are not members of the armed forces, as long as they
are acting on State instructions and are armed. 5
Although this approach is the prevailing one in the literature, is reflected
in a number of decisions by international tribunals, and has a good deal of
merit, at least in so far as it purports to make the application of IHL provisions independent of political or subjective considerations and aims to afford
victims of war the broadest possible protection, there are other views on the
matter. One is found in the 2010 Final Report of the Use of Force Committee of
the International Law Association (ILA) in which a degree of intensity is
required before an armed conflict could be said to exist and which makes no
distinction in that respect between conflicts between States and conflicts in
which at least one of the parties is an organized armed group. 6 This position
is shared by a number of other commentators and a significant amount of
State practice. 7 This position argues that border skirmishes, naval and aerial
4. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST
GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION
OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 237 (2016),
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&
documentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518.
5. Id. ¶¶ 226, 229.
6. Int’l Law Assoc., Use of Force Comm., Final Report on the Meaning of Armed
Conflict in International Law 2 (2010), http://www.rulac.org/assets/downloads/ILA_report_armed_conflict_2010.pdf [hereinafter ILA Report].
7. In addition to the authors of the ILA Report, id., see, e.g., Christopher Greenwood,
Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 48 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008); MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW
RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 46 (1982) (commentary to art.
1). For examples of State practice, see ILA Report, supra note 6, at 13–14. More recent examples include various naval incidents in the South China Sea, aerial intrusions by manned
and remotely piloted aircraft over various countries in the Middle East, clashes between
border guards on the Indo-Chinese border and along the “Line of Control” in Kashmir,
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incidents, and the like do not constitute armed conflicts as they lack the requisite degree of intensity and/or duration. This position would not extend
the application of IHL to such armed incidents and avoids making every
incident involving the armed forces, no matter how brief or inconsequential,
into an armed conflict, which seems to correspond more closely to reality
and tends to de-escalate such encounters.
What are the main strengths and weaknesses of these respective approaches? The “first shot” approach is clear and unambiguous and makes
the application of IHL virtually automatic any time there is an armed clash
between two (or more) States. This largely removes the possibility of subjective application of IHL obligations—at least in theory—and provides for the
widest possible extension of protection to any persons affected by the armed
conflict. These are strong points in favor of accepting this approach and the
reason why it has such strong support from both the ICRC and much of the
academic community. It is also probably at least partly why it has been applied in a number of decisions by international tribunals. 8
But alongside these points in support of this approach, there are a number of downsides to it. By determining that any clash between States amounts
to an armed conflict to which the full panoply of conventional and customary humanitarian law rules applies de jure as soon as a situation arises in
which any of the rules in question are in fact applied, the door is opened to
far more than just the humanitarian protection of war victims. The law of
and the seizure of three Ukrainian patrol vessels off the coast of Crimea by Russian coast
guard vessels, to name just several. In relation to the incident involving the seizure of two
Ukrainian patrol boats and an auxiliary vessel by Russian coast guard vessels, I am purposely
leaving aside the very real possibility that the seizure of the vessels took place in the context
of an ongoing armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine as a result of the
continued occupation of the Crimea since 2014 and as such would be governed by
IHL/LOAC. But since neither State referred to this possibility in relation to the incident, I
include it in the list of low-level armed incidents which arguably do not constitute an armed
conflict in themselves.
8. See ICRC COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 4, ¶ 218,
referring, inter alia, to the abovementioned statement by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Tadić, supra note 2. The Tadić Appeals Chamber decision set the standard for the application of IHL in subsequent cases before the ICTY and
other tribunals. Rogier Bartels points out that after an initial period subsequent to the Tadić
Appeals Chamber ruling, the ICTY and other tribunals seemingly took a lax approach towards conflict classification, essentially failing to distinguish whether a conflict was international or non-international. See Rogier Bartels, The Classification of Armed Conflicts by International Courts and Tribunals, 20 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 595 (2020).
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targeting in IHL allows for “status based” targeting of anyone possessing
combatant status, irrespective of whether they pose an immediate threat at
the time of targeting. It allows for the destruction, capture, or “neutralization” of any military objective that would confer a perceptible military advantage, including when this would result in significant collateral effects, as
long as these are not excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. It allows for the capture of merchant vessels pertaining to the adversary in international waters and the seizure of the merchant vessels of
neutral or non-belligerent States if they are adjudged to be transporting contraband. It allows for the severing of aerial, maritime, and digital communications of the adversary State with the outside world. It allows for the detention without trial of persons subject to capture as prisoners of war, and of
civilians who are deemed to pose a security threat to the detaining power for
the duration of the conflict or, in the case of civilians, for as long as is deemed
necessary for security. It allows for the seizure of military equipment of the
adversary as war booty as well as for the occupation of (some or all of) the
territory of the adversary State and the requisitioning of other public goods
the occupying power deems necessary for its security or its administration of
the occupied territory. These are but some of the consequences of a situation
of armed conflict. 9
Since the prevailing theory also assumes that IHL extends throughout
the territory of the opposing States, no matter how far removed from the
theater of operations, and is applicable in the international commons anywhere the vessels, aircraft, or military personnel of the adversary State may
be located, even in outer space, the possibility of the conflict becoming
worldwide in scope or extending beyond the Earth’s atmosphere is real. 10
9. See ILA Report, supra note 6, at 4 (referencing a number of the consequences of an
armed conflict).
10. The geographical and temporal scope of IHL is treated by Jann Kleffner, Scope of
Application of International Humanitarian Law in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 43 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013). The reference to the “general close of
military operations” is to be found in Article 6, Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, although
some provisions of IHL are meant to apply beyond that temporal threshold in relation to
protection of persons detained by the opposing party and occupied territory. This raises the
possibility of applying specific provisions of IHL in situations where this enhances protection of persons adversely affected in the context of armed conflict and the actual existence
of armed conflict itself. The applicability of IHL to hostilities in outer space is currently
being examined in the context of a manual devoted to application of international law in
outer space and has received some attention in the literature. One example is a recent article
by Dale Stephens, The International Legal Implications of Military Space Operations: Examining the
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Moreover, because the temporal duration of armed conflict is not completely
settled law despite the seemingly clear reference to “the general close of military operations,” this creates a situation which leaves the door potentially
open for the ongoing application of IHL for a prolonged or even indefinite
period. Finally, most commentators take the position that once an armed
conflict is underway the law relating to the use of force no longer has any
effect on how, when, and where force is applied since its function is to determine the legality of the recourse to force and not how force is actually
applied. 11 Additionally, in the event of any clash between IHL and human
rights law, the more specific norm will prevail, which in the case of an international armed conflict means IHL will virtually always take precedence over
human rights law to the extent the two clash. Consequently, the humanitarian law of armed conflict will have predominant application and legal effect
for the duration of the armed conflict, more or less setting aside any conflicting legal obligations and at the least acting alongside those which it does
not collide with and influencing the application of any parallel obligations
arising from other bodies of (international) law. 12
While this all makes sense in the event that the force employed or occupation of territory is reasonably prolonged and/or intensive (the “sense” of
these consequences increases as the intensity and duration of the clash increase), it makes much less sense to allow all of these effects to kick in as
soon as one side uses force against another State. Examples of these lesser
uses of force would be engaging in a strike aimed at a single person, an incidental exchange of fire between border guards or during a naval or aerial
incident, or whenever military or paramilitary forces acting on behalf of a
Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and the Outer Space Legal Regime, 94 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES 75 (2018).
11. This seems to be how most authors view the consequences of the equal application
of IHL to all parties to an armed conflict. These authors pay no heed to jus ad bellum considerations when discussing, for example, targeting. One notable exception to this who sees
a continued relevance for ad bellum considerations once an armed conflict has commenced
without conflating the two bodies of law is Christopher Greenwood, who in the wake of
the Falklands/Malvinas conflict set out a different approach, followed more or less here in
this essay. See Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship between the Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello,
9 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 221 (1983).
12. There is abundant literature dealing with the relationship between IHL and other
bodies of law. The International Law Commission dealt with the issue of the relationship
of different branches of international law in its sophisticated and comprehensive study on
the fragmentation of the international legal system. See Report of the Study Group of the
Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
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State are temporarily present without consent on the territory of another
State. This is the principal rationale behind the approach put forward in the
ILA committee report and it has considerable persuasiveness in not allowing
for the extension of belligerent “rights” or prerogatives to situations that are
incidental in nature and or inconsequential in their effects.
However, this approach also has potential negative consequences, of
which at least one is very problematic. Although the threshold for the existence of an armed conflict is not conclusively spelled out in this intensitybased approach, it is possible to apply the same or similar threshold criteria
used for determining the existence of a non-international armed conflict to
determine the existence of an international armed conflict. These criteria relate to the intensity and/or duration of the force applied, so application of
the criteria need not necessarily be a problem. But another possibly much
more serious consequence of an intensity criterion for the application of IHL
to clashes between States is the potential legal gap it can create. If a low
intensity use of force does not trigger the application of IHL and there is no
jurisdiction or effective control over the targeted individual by the opposing
State, there is equally no de jure applicability of human rights law, nor any
guarantee that application of domestic law or regulation by extra legal means
would provide an adequate legal framework. 13 This potentially opens a yawning gap in legal protection. For example, if there were an aerial incident in
which the military aircraft of two States clashed over international waters and
one of the aircraft was shot down, unless some rule(s) of IHL were to apply,
perhaps in combination with other bodies of international law, there would
quite likely be no applicable law to such a scenario, which would result in
what is, from a legal, moral, and policy perspective, an unacceptable outcome. There cannot, or in any event should not, be any situation in which
the use of (potentially) lethal force is not subject to legal regulation.

13. Human rights law is applicable in situations of either de jure exercise of jurisdiction
(i.e., within a State’s territory or on board its vessels or aircraft) or, according to most human
rights oversight bodies and courts, in situations where State agents exercise effective control
over individuals or territory outside the State’s territory, although the modalities of such
control are not necessarily uniform between different human rights law regimes. See, e.g.,
Jann Kleffner, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: General Issues, in THE HANDBOOK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 35 (T.D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds.,
2d ed. 2015); GERD OBERLEITNER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT: LAW, PRACTICE,
POLICY (2018); DARAGH MURRAY, PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED
CONFLICT (2016) (all of which discuss how human rights law and IHL relate, interact, and
apply to military operations above and below the threshold of armed conflict).
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III.

A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH COMBINING ELEMENTS
OF BOTH THE “FIRST SHOT” AND INTENSITY APPROACHES AND THE
APPLICATION OF AD BELLUM CONSIDERATIONS TO TARGETING

Since both of the approaches set out above have real and potential advantages and disadvantages it seems worthwhile to try to maximize the advantages of both without including their respective drawbacks or creating
new negative consequences that would be as bad or worse as the ones that
one is trying to avoid in the first place. A starting point could be to separate
the applicability of at least some humanitarian law provisions from the existence of an armed conflict. Put differently, it makes sense to apply specific
rules and principles of IHL to situations not amounting to an armed conflict
where that would ensure or enhance protection of those (potentially) affected by any use of force, while reserving the full applicability of the law of
armed conflict to situations that cross a certain threshold of intensity and/or
duration and constitute an armed conflict. If one were to say, for example,
that the basic humanitarian protections set out in Common Article 3, together with the rule that attacks may only be directed against military objectives and the requirement for humane treatment of detainees apply to any
situation involving an armed clash, including those below the threshold of
armed conflict, it would be a good starting point that went a long way towards ensuring that the object and purpose underlying the Geneva Conventions of protection of persons who were injured, in distress, or captured or
detained were respected in any situation in which force was used. But by
making the full applicability of all the rules of the law of armed conflict,
including, in particular, those allowing for the exercise of potentially farreaching belligerent “rights” and prerogatives, dependent upon a reasonably
high threshold of intensity; and perhaps for some rules, such as the law of
blockade, also the duration of the conflict, the negative effects of the “first
shot” approach could be largely avoided. But this is probably not enough in
itself to resolve all the potential issues that are raised by separating applicability of (some) IHL rules from the notion of armed conflict. What kind of
rules should be applied in relation to targeting of persons and objects in situations below the threshold of armed conflict, to whom and to what, where,
and how long would the basic humanitarian protective rules apply? What is
the threshold for its application, when does a situation below the threshold
of armed conflict cross the threshold, and what are the consequences of this?
I will attempt here to set out some possible answers in an attempt to stimulate some reflection and discussion on when IHL should apply and whether
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there is a case to be made for severing the applicability of some IHL provisions (aside from those few IHL provisions which are already applicable outside the context of an armed conflict) from the threshold of armed conflict
and where that threshold for an international armed conflict lies or should
lie. I will also offer some thoughts on how IHL relates to other bodies of
law, in particular the law governing the use of force in relation to the targeting of persons subject to attack and military objectives under IHL and to the
exercise of belligerent “rights” (better seen as prerogatives) in armed conflict
in a more general sense.
In relation to the question when the basic rules of humanitarian protection referred to above would start to apply, the logical answer would be “as
soon as any armed incident took place which necessitated their application.”
This would ensure that any armed clash, no matter how brief, would trigger
the protective effect of IHL to the extent necessary. Anyone adversely affected in the context of such a clash would benefit without any distinction
whatsoever on the basis of the legality of the actions which led to the clash
or the positions of the parties. Hence, equal application of this protection
would be ensured. Anyone wounded, in distress at sea, bailing out from an
aircraft, offering surrender, or in the hands of another State involved in such
an incident would benefit from the same protection as they would have with
a lower threshold of armed conflict. Civilians would be immune from attack,
as would military personnel entitled to protection from attack, including, in
particular, medical and religious personnel and members of peacekeeping
missions that had not become party to an armed conflict. Persons who were
in the hands of another State involved in an armed incident would receive
treatment identical to prisoners of war or interned civilians, as the case may
be. However, instead of being held for the indeterminate duration of an
armed conflict, or as long as security considerations made it necessary in the
case of detained civilians, they would have to be repatriated as soon as the
incident was over. They could be handed over without any undue delay to
their national authorities, an impartial third party such as the ICRC, or a
diplomatic representative of a third State or international organization agreed
to by the States concerned.
On the other hand, targeting in the context of such armed incidents
would be restricted to those persons and objects that were directly involved
in the armed incident and only to the extent they posed a threat of death or
serious injury to persons or capture or serious damage to essential material
or installations. Even then, use of force would be prohibited if there were
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other non-forcible alternatives available and adequate to address the situation. In short it would be identical or analogous to unit level self-defense
under the customary international law governing self-defense, except it
would have its basis in a combination of the principles of ad bellum necessity
and proportionality as part of the law governing self-defense under international law. This would be without any distinction as to which party may have
violated the prohibition of the use of force by engaging in an (incipient)
armed attack at the tactical level, and alongside IHL rules based on the principle of distinction while being informed by and applied in parallel with considerations of human rights law relating to the strict necessity of using (potentially) lethal force and the limitation of force to what was required to safeguard life or other essential interests. 14 This would ensure that no “legal gap”
would exist, whereby no body of law would apply to targeting in situations
falling below the threshold of armed conflict. It would also avoid the potential conflation of the legality of the recourse to force with the actual exercise
of force, which could happen if one only applied the jus ad bellum as the
14. While this combination may look like a rather improvised cocktail at first, it in fact
already has a wide degree of acceptance and application, albeit not necessarily in exactly the
same way as formulated here. I have purposely identified the targeting rules of IHL based
on the principle of distinction as a core set of obligations that can be, and is, applied regularly
to military operations of all types, including below the threshold of armed conflict in the
form of targeting directives or rules of engagement (ROE) requiring that force may only be
used against military objectives. I am simply arguing that this set of obligations should apply
as IHL even in situations below the threshold of armed conflict, instead of merely as ROE
or other non-legal directives, which is to say it would be considered as a principle of customary law applicable at all times. This would ensure that it was applicable to everyone and
not dependent on how ROE were formulated and what their legal effect was. The same
essentially applies to the notion of necessity as part of the right of self-defense as being the
ultimate test under ad bellum law of whether a need to apply force exists. In this context it
signifies an immediate necessity to react to ongoing or impending force and the absence of
feasible alternatives to the use of force. Proportionality ad bellum would restrict the use of
force to the immediate proximity of the threat and only for as long as the incident lasted.
Finally, human rights bodies regularly apply and interpret human rights law in the context
of other applicable law and in light of the factual situation. In relation to the right of life it
provides for a strict test of necessity regarding the use lethal force when no other options
are available. So there is nothing very revolutionary in my proposal. What I am not proposing
is applying the principle of so-called “restrictive military necessity,” which, according to
some writers, exists in IHL/LOAC. In my opinion it is debatable whether such a principle
exists in IHL/LOAC in the first place (as opposed to military necessity stricto sensu as part
of the general framework of IHL). Even if it does, whether it applies to the actions of individuals instead of acting as a foundational principle of IHL/LOAC alongside humanity is
debatable.
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standard for targeting of persons and objects during the confrontation itself.
However, the jus ad bellum would be directly relevant in relation to not only
whether it was necessary to apply force but also to where and how long any
use of force would be legitimate in an ad bellum context. This in turn would
limit any force used to the immediate vicinity of the incident and only for as
long as the situation lasted. This flows from the application of ad bellum considerations of necessity and proportionality that govern an incidental use of
force in the context of what is sometimes referred to as “on the spot reaction” or “unit level self-defense.” 15 The difference would be that the targeting limitations would apply to both “sides” involved in an armed incident
due to the application of IHL targeting rules deriving from the principle of
distinction and of human rights law, irrespective of whether they were acting
in conformity with jus ad bellum in resorting to force in the first place. This
because the principles of necessity and proportionality governing any use of
force, viewed in context with human rights law, would apply at all times to
all “parties” irrespective of whether they were acting in conformity with the
UN Charter or other (putative) legal justifications for recourse to force.
If a use of force by a State was not restricted in its intensity and duration
and formed, in itself or in combination with a series of closely related incidents, a reasonably intensive application of force against another State, or
otherwise resulted in occupation of another State’s territory, the threshold
for the existence of an international armed conflict would be crossed and
more rules of the law of armed conflict would become applicable. The intensity criteria used to determine the threshold of an international armed
conflict could (and should) be identical to or very similar to those used to
determine the existence of a non-international armed conflict, which have
been set out in a number of international decisions and have gained broad
acceptance. 16 These include the type of weapons used, the number of casualties resulting from any use of force by either party, the types of targets
15. For a treatment of unit level self-defense, also referred to as “on the spot reaction,”
see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 261–64 (6th ed. 2017);
J.F.R. BODDENS HOSANG, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS 83–93 (2020). For a reference by the ICJ to this modality of selfdefense, see Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 73 (Nov. 6).
16. The ICTY elaborated on the criteria for the existence of a NIAC in various decisions following Tadić. These were summarized in the Boškoski Trial Chamber decision, Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Case No. IT 04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 177 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008), and included, among others, the criteria named
here.
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engaged, the (apparently intended) effects on the targeted State, and the duration of the application of force, to name some logical choices. In relation
to occupation that did not include the use of force by either party, the question of whether the threshold was met would depend on the nature and effect of the non-consensual presence of foreign armed forces on the targeted
State. Has the State engaged in a non-consensual presence expelled the civil
or military authorities of the territorial State or otherwise interfered with the
administration of its territory? Has it taken over or exercised any governmental functions? Is its presence in any way directed against the territorial
State or its population? Is the presence more than transitory or incidental?
These are some of the most relevant considerations.
Once an international armed conflict exists it makes sense from both a
military and a humanitarian perspective to apply more of the rules of the
humanitarian law of armed conflict. Which ones is a question worth asking.
Does the existence of an armed conflict automatically mean that all the rules
become, or should become, applicable? One could argue that they do, but
that only those rules that actually need to be applied as a result of a factual
situation will in fact be applied. That is the way it is generally done now; all
the IHL rules are de jure applicable, but we only use the rules we need to in
a specific context. Again, the advantage of this approach is that the applicability is unambiguous and not subject to subjective considerations. But it
leaves the initiative in the hands of any State that wants to use any or all the
force it has at its disposal once the threshold of armed conflict is passed,
even if the conflict is (relatively) limited in scope and duration. Consequently,
the law can be used as an instrument to further one’s interests if there are, in
principle, no limitations on which rules of the law of armed conflict apply.
So, for instance, if a given State has a preponderance of air power, it can
engage in bombardment of any object constituting a military objective that
makes a contribution to military action and arguably confers a military advantage once the threshold for an armed conflict is passed. In relation to
military objectives by nature, this is virtually automatically considered to be
the case. The same seems to apply to leadership and command and control
functions and these have been routinely targeted as a matter of course in
many recent conflicts, including those with relatively limited scope and objectives. 17 If a military objective is one by virtue of its use, purpose (i.e., future
17. With regard to targeting law and the notion of “military advantage,” see, e.g., Michael
Schmitt, Targeting, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 269, 277–81; W.H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 98–107
(2012). “Leadership targeting” has been routinely engaged in by various States with both
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use), or location, attacking it must confer a perceptible military advantage
under the circumstances ruling at the time. But this is arguably the case with
regard to a wide range of potential targets, as the bombardment of bridges,
roads, electrical power plants, and even TV stations in past conflicts illustrate. If a State has a clear advantage in naval capacity it can impose a blockade of the other State’s coast, as Israel did in its 2006 armed conflict with
Lebanon, or cut off specific ports from access to the open sea, as Russia has
done with regard to part of the Ukrainian coast in the Black Sea. If a State
has advanced cyber capabilities, it can use these to take out critical functions
in the target State, degrading its communications and the ability of the political and military leadership to effectively function, as long as these operations
are not deliberately directed against purely civilian data systems and are not
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage sought. This leaves
a wide choice of potential targets in the digital domain open to attack or
subject to operations that might have the same effects as an attack, but don’t
technically qualify as such because they are not violent in nature or because
data may not constitute an “object” for purposes of applying targeting law. 18
In short, since in principle everything is allowed under IHL that is not specifically prohibited or limited, once an armed conflict is deemed to exist the
law of armed conflict allows for the application of a great deal of coercion,
unless one chooses for whatever reason to exercise restraint. Restraint is,
however, often in short supply and this leaves the door open for abuse of
manned and unmanned aircraft in a whole range of situations, some of which included socalled “personality strikes” directed against individuals that were conducted either outside
the context of a recognizable conflict or where in any case it was open to question whether
IHL was applicable. See, e.g., Agnes Callamard, The Targeted Killing of General Soleimani: Its
Lawfulness and Why It Matters, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/67949/the-targeted-killing-of-general-soleimani-its-lawfulness-and-why-it-matters/. This type of targeting was also engaged in during the aerial campaign against Libya in
2011, which had its legal basis in a UN Security Council resolution to protect civilians. For
the official NATO position, see Jorge Benitez, NATO’s Official Policy on Killing Gaddafi, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (July 13, 2011), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-s-official-policy-on-killing-gaddafi/. For a comprehensive analysis of the conflict,
see M. Cherif Bassiouni, The NATO Campaign; An Analysis of the 2011 Intervention, in LIBYA:
FROM REPRESSION TO REVOLUTION 197 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2013).
18. On the ongoing controversy regarding the targeting of data under IHL/LOAC, see
Paul A.L. Ducheine, Military Cyber Operations, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 13, at 456, 474–75. See also Paul A.L. Ducheine
& T.D. Gill, From Cyber Operations to Effects: Some Targeting Issues, NETHERLANDS MILITARY
LAW REVIEW (Aug. 17, 2018), https://puc.overheid.nl/mrt/doc/PUC_248377_11/1/.
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the law by engaging in acts that are not in themselves necessarily in violation
of any specific rule of IHL, but that can have a devastating effect on the
target State, widen or prolong the conflict, and have long lasting consequences.
One way to avoid this is to apply the law relating to the use of force, in
particular the ad bellum considerations of necessity and proportionality, to the
nature of the targets that could be engaged, as well as to the duration and
geographical scope of targeting. Jus in bello rules of IHL relating to the conduct of hostilities would also apply, with the ad bellum rules acting to some
extent as a parallel level restraint on the exercise of belligerent prerogatives
under the law of armed conflict. Such application of ad bellum necessity and
proportionality considerations clearly must be on an equal basis for all parties, irrespective of whether the initial or ongoing resort to force by a particular party was lawful in the ad bellum context to ensure it is not dependent on
subjective factors and provides for an equal scope of action. In other words,
while the law relating to the use of force is separate from the law of armed
conflict and each have their own respective spheres of application, they do
not operate in isolation from each other but are instead components of an
overarching legal system. 19 Both will apply to any situation in which force is
used, including once an armed conflict is underway. While ad bellum law will
not affect the obligations of the parties under IHL, and IHL will allow for both
parties to target persons and objects subject to attack under the principle of
belligerent equality, there is no reason why ad bellum considerations of necessity and proportionality cannot limit the scope of the application of IHL
rules relating to the targeting of persons and objects subject to attack, as long
as both sides have the same rights and obligations in terms of limiting the
scope of the conflict. So, if an armed conflict is relatively limited in scope,
for example, as a result of an incursion by one State into another over a
disputed parcel of territory, or an armed incident escalates into a more prolonged and/or intensive exchange of fire between two States, ad bellum considerations of necessity and proportionality would be relevant in determining
19. In addition to Greenwood, supra note 11, see Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence
and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 273 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989). On
the same basic theme, the present author has also taken the position that while separate, the
ius ad bellum and ius in bello are both relevant to targeting and that the criteria from both must
be met for an act to be fully in compliance with international law. T.D. Gill, Some Considerations on the Role of the Ius ad Bellum in Targeting, in TARGETING: THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN
WARFARE 101 (Paul A.L. Ducheine et al. eds., 2016).
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the scope of targeting to what was strictly necessary and proportionate in
terms of the overall situation. Those ad bellum considerations would rule out,
for example, the targeting of the political and military leadership of the opponent, its communications and industrial infrastructure, and military objectives by nature that posed no direct threat to the operations of the State in
question in an armed conflict of limited scope and duration. It would also
affect the geographical and temporal scope of the application of targeting
rules to what was necessary and proportionate under the circumstances. The
rationale for this is quite straightforward; why should a party be allowed to
target someone or something subject to attack simply because IHL does not
prohibit its being targeted if it is not strictly necessary or would widen or
prolong the scope of the conflict?
One might ask why ad bellum considerations should influence targeting
of objects which are subject to attack under IHL, but one could equally ask
why they should not? The idea that once an armed conflict starts ad bellum
considerations become irrelevant ignores what the respective functions of ad
bellum law and IHL/LOAC are and is based on a mistaken presumption that
the separation of the law relating to the use of force and the equal application
of humanitarian law of armed conflict requires the complete exclusion of ad
bellum law once an armed conflict commences. But this is neither a logical
corollary to the principle of equal application of IHL, nor an accurate rendition of the functions of both sets of rules. The law relating to the use of
force not only determines under which conditions a recourse to force is lawful, but also influences what degree of force is acceptable for the duration of
its application. Otherwise, the notions of necessity and proportionality in the
ad bellum context would be virtually meaningless; they are obviously meant
to regulate in an overall sense the degree to which force is lawful in relation
to the purpose underlying the resort to force for as long as force is applied.
While necessity and proportionality are part of the right of self-defense, they
do not directly relate to the execution of a mandate given by the UN Security
Council authorizing the use of force (usually designated as “all necessary
means”) for a particular purpose. But here too the execution of the mandate
is predicated on the degree of force required to achieve the objective of the
mandate and may not exceed what is required to that end. So, the degree of
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force required to execute the mandate is very close to necessity and proportionality in the context of self-defense, and hence no distinction as to how
necessity works in relation to any use of force will be made in this essay. 20
The function of targeting rules under IHL/LOAC is distinct but not totally unrelated. They determine which persons and objects are protected
from attack and by implication allow for the targeting of persons and objects
which are not protected. They set out rules for prohibiting attacks on persons and objects subject to attack that would result in excessive incidental
and collateral effects among civilians and other protected persons and objects in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated at
the time the attack is undertaken. They also provide for feasible precautionary measures to prevent or limit such effects as far as possible under the
circumstances ruling at the time. These considerations are primarily relevant
at the tactical and operational level since the overall objective of “winning
the war” is not part of an IHL proportionality assessment. 21 However, none
of this is negatively affected by taking ad bellum considerations into account
when determining what kind of targets may be engaged so long as the application of IHL rules is not applied differently to the parties to the conflict
based on considerations of which side is acting lawfully in terms of resorting
to force. A lawful target under IHL remains a lawful target for both sides,
irrespective whether ad bellum considerations are taken into account or not.
But this doesn’t mean that these two bodies of law are mutually incompatible
or that anything that is allowed under IHL should be automatically subject
20. Necessity (and proportionality), as part of self-defense, is obviously not applicable
to action undertaken to restore peace and security in the context of the UN collective security system. But, as is clear from the language used in Security Council mandates authorizing
the use of “all necessary means,” it is a principle of general application in the use of force.
In any situation amounting to an armed conflict, necessity and proportionality, as part of
the law governing the use of force, will act alongside IHL in regulating the degree of force
allowable to achieve the objective of, for example, warding off an attack or suppressing a
breach of the peace. For an analysis of the function of necessity and proportionality as principles regulating the overall scope of the force permissible in the context of self-defense, see
TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER 91 (2010); CHRISTIAN
HENDERSON, THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 229–39 (2018). For a more
comprehensive analysis by the present author, see T.D. Gill & K. Tibori Szabo, Twelve Key
Questions on Self-Defense against Non-State Actors, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 457, 490–
92 (2019).
21. See supra note 17 and sources cited therein regarding proportionality and precautions
in attack within the context of IHL. See also Int’l Law Ass’n Study Group on the Conduct
of Hostilities in the 21st Century, The Conduct of Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law:
Challenges of 21st Century Warfare, 93 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 322 (2017).
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to attack during an armed conflict, even if doing so would clearly be incompatible with the limitations posed by ad bellum considerations of necessity and
proportionality seen against the factual context of the conflict.
So while destroying the General Staff or the National Security Council
(or their equivalents) of the opposing State would clearly confer a direct and
probably substantial military advantage in any armed conflict and would presumably not violate the principle of distinction, since the targeted individuals
would in all likelihood be subject to attack, this would not be a lawful targeting in ad bellum terms in the context of a relatively limited conflict, such as
have occurred along the Indo-Pakistan frontier or between Israel and Lebanon on a number of occasions. Neither would it likely be necessary or proportionate in ad bellum terms to degrade the communications infrastructure,
attack the electrical power grid, or attack an industrial installation that supplied equipment to the armed forces, simply because they might qualify as
lawful military objectives when a conflict is relatively limited in scope and/or
duration. This also applies to the exercise of belligerent “rights” at sea and
in the cyber domain. A naval blockade (as opposed to a possible interdiction
of a significantly more limited scope for a specific purpose) has no place in
a conflict of limited intensity or duration. Neither does attacking the critical
digital infrastructure of the opposing State by cyber means, even if it (partly)
fulfills a military function and would convey significant military advantage.
The reason for this is that completely closing off access to a State’s coast or
disrupting the core functions of a State are not likely to be necessary or proportionate in ad bellum terms within the context of an armed conflict of relatively limited scope and/or duration. In short, targeting in an armed conflict
is, or should be subject to both IHL (is the target a lawful military objective,
would targeting it confer a military advantage, and can it be targeted without
causing excessive collateral effects) and ad bellum considerations of necessity
and proportionality. Is it necessary to target this particular military objective
to obtain the lawful goal of executing a UNSC mandate, or warding off an
ongoing or imminent attack and would targeting it probably lead to an aggravation or prolongation of the conflict when this can be avoided? Consequently, in relation to targeting, ad bellum considerations can act as a restraint
on the applicability of particular IHL rules allowing for targeting or the exercise of particular belligerent prerogatives when this would be clearly incompatible with the scope of the conflict. Moreover, ad bellum considerations
should be integrated into the targeting rules of engagement and directives of
all parties to an armed conflict alongside IHL rules relating to conduct of
hostilities. Also, for that matter, human rights law where targeting is not
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done in the context of conduct of hostilities between opposing parties, but
rather in the context of maintenance of order and exercise of authority over
persons or territory inside or outside the context of an ongoing armed conflict, often referred to as the “law enforcement paradigm.” 22
On the other hand, in an armed conflict between two or more States,
there is no reason to limit the protective scope of IHL as soon as a situation
arises which triggers application of the relevant provisions. So, persons captured would be treated as POWs under Geneva Convention III or civilian
detainees under Geneva Convention IV, territory occupied would trigger the
application of the law of belligerent occupation once the conditions were
met, and so forth. All of the obligations and prohibitions on any party to an
armed conflict under IHL would apply as soon as any situation arose where
they needed to be applied. So ad bellum law would not be displacing IHL,
undermining the notion of equal application of IHL, or otherwise affecting
the relationship between the two bodies of law, other than to admit that ad
bellum law does not dissipate or fly out the window as soon as IHL kicks in—
not even if one were to reject the “first shot” approach and require a degree
of intensity and/or duration for an armed conflict to exist.
These ad bellum considerations can also affect the targeting of persons
and objects subject to attack alongside IHL rules relating to targeting. One
thing that would have to be done in terms of adjusting the law is to ensure
that the ad bellum considerations of necessity and proportionality applied
equally to all parties in the context of determining which type of targets were
permissible to be engaged, irrespective of whether the resort to force was
lawful under ad bellum law. In short, the factual scope of the conflict should
be the primary determining factor in applying ad bellum considerations of necessity and proportionality to targeting alongside IHL and not the “justice”
of the cause of the parties. This means that if the conflict was of medium/high intensity from the onset or gradually, or more rapidly, escalated
into what constituted a “war” in a factual if not necessarily in a formal legal
sense, ad bellum considerations relating to targeting would become increas-

22. For in depth treatment of the interplay between IHL and human rights law and
their respective roles in the conduct of hostilities and the exercise of authority over persons
or territory, often referred to as the “law enforcement paradigm,” see Nils Melzer & Gloria
Gaggioli Gasteyger, Conceptual Distinction and Overlaps between Law Enforcement and the Conduct
of Hostilities, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
63, supra note 13.
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ingly less relevant as the conflict moved up the scale of intensity and duration. 23 Once a conflict reached this stage, the full exercise of belligerent
“rights” (actually these are more accurately seen as prerogatives) by all parties
within the limitations posed by IHL would become much more plausible and
acceptable from both a legal and a policy standpoint. The parties would still
have to keep in mind that even such conflicts always have limits and are
waged for a particular purpose. Targeting should reflect those considerations, even in the most intensive of armed conflicts that amounted to fullscale war.
In summary, the approach set out in rough outline above involves two
major points. Firstly, raising the threshold for the existence of an international armed conflict to avoid potential escalation of a situation involving an
incidental armed clash between two States. Secondly, ensuring that the humanitarian purpose of IHL is not undermined or a potential legal gap is
opened by applying a basic set of protections to any situation involving a use
of force under the threshold of armed conflict. In such cases, any force used
would have to conform to the strict necessity of “unit level” self-defense.
Also, these cases would employ a sliding scale of applicability of IHL rules
relating to targeting and the exercise of belligerent “rights” or prerogatives
once the threshold of intensity for the existence of an international armed
conflict was met (using the same or similar criteria for determining the
threshold for international armed conflict (IAC) as are now used in determining the existence of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC)). The
range of permissible targets and exercise of other belligerent prerogatives
and “rights” would be linked to the scope and intensity of the conflict. In
that context, the considerations of ad bellum necessity and proportionality
would act alongside other applicable law in determining which targets were
open to being engaged. These could be integrated into rules of engagement
and targeting directives and instructions to ensure that in addition to meeting
the requirements for lawful attack under IHL, the engagement of the target
or application of a particular belligerent prerogative was necessary and proportionate in ad bellum terms and would not needlessly lead to aggravation of
the conflict. Finally, if a conflict were to take place at the upper end of the
intensity scale, this would mean that the full range of permissible targets and
exercise of belligerent prerogatives within the limits posed by IHL, such as
23. On the application of the principles of necessity and proportionality ad bellum once
an armed conflict reaches the stage of intensity of a “war,” see Dinstein, supra note 15, at
281–88.
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imposition of a blockade or leadership targeting, would be(come) permissible options as long as they did not result in needlessly prolonging or expanding the conflict and were not clearly disproportionate in relation to the scale
of the application of force by the opposing party.
IV.
A FEW WORDS ON THE APPLICATION OF IHL IN THE CONTEXT OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, AND IN RELATION TO THE
ICRC’S “SUPPORT-BASED APPROACH”
I would now like to turn to the application of the humanitarian law of armed
conflict in the context of NIAC and subsequently say a few words on the
ICRC’s “support-based approach.” Firstly, I will say a few words regarding
the application of IHL to different levels of intensity of NIAC and then turn
to why I don’t think the support-based approach is either a necessary or
useful interpretation of the law or good policy. For the record, I rely on a
definition of a NIAC in this context as any armed conflict of a reasonably
sustained and intensive nature whereby at least one of the parties is an armed
group and in which any party to it has a degree of organization which enables
it to plan and conduct military operations and has some kind of internal hierarchy and disciplinary structure which makes it possible to incorporate and
enforce the rules of IHL. It can be an internal NIAC between an organized
armed group and the State’s government, a conflict in which armed groups
oppose each other, an internal conflict involving one or more armed groups
that has “spilled over” into a neighboring State or spans several States, or
where an organized armed group conducts operations from the territory of
one State against another State. All of these are NIACs from the perspective
of the nature of the parties and applicable IHL regime.
A. Lowering the Threshold of Non-International Armed Conflict
In this section I examine two questions. First, how realistic and wise is it to
lower the threshold of non-international armed conflict, while at the same
time progressively expanding the scope of the legal regime applicable in the
context of NIAC? Second, is there a case for linking the applicability of certain rules of the humanitarian law of armed conflict to the scale of the conflict?
To start, I would like to pose a question regarding the wisdom of the
steady lowering of the threshold of non-international armed conflict over
the course of the past twenty-five years or so viewed against the background
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of the exponential increase in the number and density of IHL rules which
are deemed to apply in NIAC since Tadić. In 1995 in Tadić, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) first decided that whatever was unacceptable in international armed conflict must be equally unacceptable in the context of NIAC. The rules applicable to NIAC were further
expanded when the ICRC published its customary IHL study some ten years
later. 24 I pose the question simply to invite some critical reflection on the
realism of, on the one hand lowering the threshold for the existence of a
NIAC well below anything contemplated when the Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols were adopted, while at the same time applying
a vastly expanded corpus of IHL rules to any NIAC. Furthermore, these
rules are being applied to NIAC regardless of factors such as the organizational capacity of the parties, intensity of the conflict, and degree of control
over territory and relative strength of the contending parties. These are some
of the more obvious factors which will influence the ability of an armed
group (and some States for that matter) to be able to comply with such an
expanded set of rules that extend way beyond what States were prepared to
accept in the context of NIAC when Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II were first adopted. The question then is how realistic is it to expect
that parties in any NIAC, regardless of the intensity and duration of the conflict, the degree of organization of the parties, and other relevant factors,
would be able to incorporate a comprehensive and sophisticated set of rules
such as the 141 rules of customary IHL that the ICRC deems applicable to
NIAC into the conduct of their operations and enforce them adequately?
Indeed, the rules applicable to NIAC have been expanded to the extent that
many commentators now wonder why any distinction between IAC and
24. The threshold for application of IHL to internal conflicts contemplated by the
drafters of Common Article 3 was a good deal higher than it is now. See SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 156–62 (2012). The
threshold for Additional Protocol II is closer to what many delegations sought during the
diplomatic conference of 1949 and is set out in Article 1. The Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY opined in its 1995 decision on the interlocutory appeal in the Tadić case that “what is
inhumane, and consequently proscribed in international wars cannot but be inhumane and
inadmissible in civil strife.” Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 119 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). While this statement referred to weapons which are banned
as inherently indiscriminate or inhumane, such as chemical weapons, and in that context is
reasonably non-controversial, it has been used to justify the application of the law relating
to the conduct of hostilities in international armed conflict to non-international conflicts
without any distinction being made, as is largely the case in the context of the ICRC Customary IHL Study released in 2005 and in subsequent decisions of the ICTY.
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NIAC is even necessary. 25 How realistic is it to, on the one hand lower the
threshold for NIAC to somewhere in the grey area that separates “sporadic
armed violence” from NIAC, while at the same time expanding the scope of
the rules applicable to the conflict to approximate those applicable in traditional interstate conflicts?
Nobody would deny that it is desirable that the IHL rules afford the
maximum amount of protection possible to civilians and civilian objects;
provide safeguards for humane treatment of persons under the control of a
party to the conflict; and provide the basic humanitarian protection and fundamental guarantees contained in Common Article 3 for both civilians and
persons hors de combat. But the humanitarian law of armed conflict must be
realistically capable of being applied and enforced if it is to have more than
hortatory significance. So, the rules should also be capable of being internalized and “digested,” that is to say implemented and enforced by any party to
a NIAC, if they are to apply across the board in any NIAC. But while some
rules are capable of being readily implemented irrespective of the degree of
sophistication and organization of the parties, 26 other rules are a good deal
more dependent upon the nature and intensity of the conflict, the organizational capacity of the parties, and other factors in order to be realistically
capable of being complied with. 27 If one takes a close look at, for example,
what is set out in the ICRC customary humanitarian law study in relation to
the taking of precautions and application of the proportionality rule in conducting attacks, the capacity of the parties to meet such obligations will be
likely dependent upon a whole range of factors—even assuming they are
willing to do so and don’t reject IHL as an alien or imposed set of rules from
“outside.”
25. The ICTY Appeals Chamber opined that maintaining the distinction between interState conflict and NIAC “would ignore the very purpose of the Geneva Conventions.”
Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 172 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). This opinion was endorsed by various commentators as
a major advance. Some observers were not so convinced. For a more critical perspective, see
John F. Murphy, Will-o’-the Wisp? The Search for Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 88
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 15 (2012).
26. Examples of these rules include the fundamental guarantees in NIAC contained in
Common Article 3 and the basic principle that attacks must be directed against persons and
objects subject to attack.
27. Examples of these factors include whether they control sufficient territory to avoid
co-location of military objectives with civilians and whether they have the organizational
capacity and means to effectuate an orderly and humane evacuation of civilians from a zone
of operations.
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Target verification by members of an armed group will, for example, be
of a radically different order than what a party with access to remote sensors
and aerial reconnaissance can be expected to do, at least if one is talking
about the use of indirect fires such as rockets, artillery, or other systems capable of firing beyond visual range. One can readily agree that when launching an attack there must be reasonable certainty that the object or person to
be engaged is a lawful military objective. This does not mean, however, that
it can be realistically expected that many armed groups (but not all) will be
able to do much in the way of target verification beyond ascertaining the
nature of the target with what is visible to the naked eye or with the assistance
of simple visual enhancement such as a telescopic sight on a rifle or a pair of
binoculars. Similarly, the ability of an armed group to carry out a targeting
process in which the means of warfare to be used in a particular attack were
selected with a view to avoiding or minimizing harm to civilians presupposes
a high degree of training and organization and a choice of weapons and munitions often beyond what many armed groups possess. Likewise, the ability
of an armed group to carry out orderly evacuations of civilians or provide
for hospital and safety zones will depend greatly on their degree of organization and level of control over territory, to name just several other examples
of rules that are assumed to apply in any conflict. To simply assume that
such obligations apply in any NIAC, irrespective of such considerations, is
to expect the impossible. At the end of the day what use is it to proclaim the
existence of rules designed for application by State armed forces with access
to (relatively) advanced technology and legal advice and extend their applicability in principle to any NIAC, when probably only a limited number of
armed groups are capable—even if willing—of meaningful compliance? I do
not have a ready-made answer to the question of which rules should apply
across the board, or only in certain circumstances if one is willing to admit
there should be some differentiation in the degree of regulation based on
objective factors. But I do think it would make sense to think about when
certain rules should apply in the context of a NIAC with a view to the capability of the parties to meet the obligations laid down in them and not simply
wish a rule into existence because it “looks nice.” So, I offer this question as
an invitation to start thinking about this challenge and to apply all the characteristics of IHL (balancing humanitarian, military, and practical considerations) to the question of when a specific rule would apply in NIAC. The
analysis should include the possibility of applying the rule with any realistic
chance of compliance and taking into account objective factors such as the
nature, duration, and intensity of the conflict, the degree of organization of
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the parties, and the degree of control over territory. It should also include
purely humanitarian considerations.
As a start to this discussion, I offer this proposal to help get it off the
ground. The threshold for NIAC is somewhat less problematic than it is for
conflicts between States according to the “first shot” approach, since there
is at least a threshold of intensity and (perhaps to a lesser extent) duration
required, alongside a reasonable degree of organization in order to qualify as
a NIAC. While this probably needs some further clarification so as to clearly
and definitely exclude widespread spontaneous and semi-organized violence,
as well as organized violent criminal activity, the criteria of organization and
intensity are themselves realistic and capable of being applied reasonably objectively. 28 But in a similar fashion as proposed above in relation to the application of LOAC rules relating to the conduct of hostilities in international
armed conflicts according to the scale and duration of the conflict, it makes
sense to also apply the rules relating to the conduct of hostilities in a NIAC
along a sliding scale in which the degree of intensity of the conflict and organizational capacity of the contenders will determine which rules of
IHL/LOAC would apply or, more to the point, would be realistically capable
of being applied.

28. The designation of “civil disturbance or unrest” is, it is submitted, vague and openended and probably leaves too much doubt about where the threshold of armed conflict
exactly lies. It leaves the door potentially open to apply the law of armed conflict to situations that, while sometimes violent, are nowhere near any reasonable threshold for moving
up the scale of intensity from law enforcement methods of controlling violence to conducting hostilities. To illustrate how the vagueness of this designation is potentially open to
abuse think of how various governments have reacted to widespread civil unrest in the recent past. For example, the use of the armed forces to suppress protests in Myanmar, Egypt,
Syria, Belarus, and elsewhere, or the increasing militarization of the suppression of criminal
activity in several Latin American countries—to name several examples—all of which have
resulted in widespread human rights abuses and excessive force being used, even rising to
the level of crimes against humanity in some cases. During the protests in the United States
following the death of George Floyd in the summer of 2020, some of which saw serious
breakdowns in public order and widespread property damage and looting, but nothing remotely resembling an armed insurrection, the then-President of the United States, Donald
Trump, threatened to implement the Insurrection Act of 1807 to quell the disturbances,
although this threat was not supported by the governor of any state or by key members of
his own cabinet or the leadership of the armed forces. See Dareh Gregorian et al., Trump
Says He Will Deploy Military If State Officials Can’t Control Violence, NBC NEWS, (June 1, 2020,
9:25 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-considering-move-invoke-insurrection-act-n1221326.
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At the lower end of the intensity scale at or just above the threshold for
existence of a NIAC, the basic principle of distinction and related rules prohibiting the targeting of civilians and civilian objects, alongside some elementary considerations of proportionality and precautions, are capable of being
applied by both the State and non-State entity. At least, that is, for any nonState entity that met the organizational criteria for application of IHL in any
situation whereby the use of force was intensive enough to warrant the application of “the means and methods of warfare” (hostilities paradigm)
against the adversary. These would figure alongside the basic guarantees of
humane treatment and elementary considerations of humanity set out in
Common Article 3, such as: prohibiting violence directed against persons
hors de combat; denial of quarter; prohibiting the taking of hostages; prohibiting enforced servitude, including recruitment of child soldiers and the use of
involuntary human shields; providing for the basic humane treatment of persons in captivity, including the provision of medical assistance where necessary and within the capabilities of the actors. To this should be added a basic
prohibition of wanton destruction of non-essential property without any military significance or acts of violence or pillage directed against cultural property, places of worship, or facilities or installations devoted to medical purposes, or which are essential for the basic well-being of the civilian population. Finally, prohibition of the use of poisonous weapons or booby traps,
unmarked anti-personnel minefields, expanding bullets, and chemical and
biological weapons also belong in the list of essential rules applicable in any
armed conflict. All of these safeguards are realistically capable of being met
by any group with sufficient organization to qualify as a party to an armed
conflict. All would almost certainly merit the qualification of customary law
applicable to any party to an armed conflict. As the conflict moved up the
scale of intensity and the organizational capacity of the actors correspondingly increased to approach or approximate the threshold for the application
of Additional Protocol II, so too would the scope of the applicability of the
rules related to conduct of hostilities, detention, treatment of civilians in territory controlled by one of the parties, and certain other rules (for example,
use of uniforms and indicators). Arguably, the scope of applicability of human rights law would also increase in so far as the non-State actor had supplanted the authority of the State with its own authority and administration
of territory and population. 29
29. On the application of human rights law to organized armed groups in non-international armed conflict, see KATHARINE FORTIN, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED GROUPS
UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2017).
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None of this would automatically change the status of the parties or create a completely equal and level playing field between non-State armed
groups and the State(s) they were combatting because of the lack of combatant status and privilege in NIAC and the unlawfulness of rebellion or insurrection under domestic law, but it makes good sense to provide that to the
extent the non-State actor conformed or at least made a good faith effort to
conform as far as possible with these safeguards. That non-State actor would
receive a greater degree of consideration and partial or total waiver of prosecution for acts that conformed to the law of armed conflict and human
rights law, if not necessarily for the act of taking up arms against the government. Ideally, this should be a rule of law and not simply a hortatory aspiration as it now essentially is. While one might wish for more from a humanitarian perspective, this is probably as far as States might be prepared to go
and as far as many, indeed probably most, armed groups would be realistically capable of going. Obviously, the lack of belligerent equality in the full
sense in NIAC should not in any way stand in the way of equal applicability
of IHL obligations to all parties in any conflict. 30 In any case, this proposal
is meant as a catalyst to stimulate thinking on the topic and not as an end
product. In summary, the basic idea of not assuming “one size fits all” when
applying IHL/LOAC in any armed conflict is the starting point for rethinking how it should and could apply. It can serve as a way to prevent the law
from being misused as a means to promote interests, while avoiding unrealistic expectations relating to the ability of non-State actors to meet a comprehensive and sophisticated set of rules when they most likely lack the capacity to do so. At the same time, it can safeguard the impartial application
of the basic protections set out in the law.
B. The ICRC “Support-Based Approach” and Some Reasons for Rejecting It as
Either Existing Law or Good Policy
The application of IHL to peace operations carried out by multinational
forces in support of a host nation, usually under a mandate by the UN Security Council, has always been somewhat problematic. The UN, regional organizations, and, for that matter, most troop contributing countries (TCCs)
participating in such operations have consistently been and often still are
30. For a discussion of whether and how the principle of belligerent equality applies to
NIAC, see a recent essay by the present author: Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Some Thoughts on
Belligerent Equality in Non-International Armed Conflict, 51 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (2020).
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reluctant to admit that they can become parties to an armed conflict in the
context of carrying out their mandate. After the failure of the UN to prevent
atrocities in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, the pressure
to provide protection to civilians from violence by armed groups and bands
has triggered an expansion of the authorization by the Security Council to
use force by multinational peacekeeping forces. This has in turn led to some
multinational forces becoming party to an armed conflict in a number of
situations, notwithstanding the basic principles underlying UN peacekeeping
of consent of the parties, impartiality, and force limited to self-defense. 31 In
some cases this was due to the fact that the multinational force was mandated
to carry out offensive operations in direct support of a government. In others the mandate authorized force for specific purposes such as protection of
civilians and provision of general support to the host nation to provide for
a secure and stable environment. This raises the question of when such support and use of force results in the multinational force becoming a party to
an armed conflict. In the Secretary General’s Bulletin of 1999, the UN finally
recognized that the “principles of humanitarian law” will apply to its forces
when they become engaged in the use of force in self-defense or execution
of the mandate for the duration of their engagement. However, this does not
answer the question of when a multinational peacekeeping force loses its
protection from attack and becomes subject to IHL as a matter of law, rather
than as a matter of internal guidelines or as a matter of policy. 32 The short
answer provided by most experts is that the entity conducting the peacekeeping mission can become party to a preexisting NIAC by sustained forms
of support to a party to the conflict amounting to direct participation in hostilities, or as a result of crossing the threshold for applicability of IHL as a
result of the intensity and organizational thresholds for the existence of a
NIAC being met, on the basis of the exact same criteria as apply for any
other actor in any non-international armed conflict. But that answer, simple
and straightforward as it appears, has failed to end the discussion. 33
31. For comprehensive treatment of the law and UN doctrine and that of selected other
international organizations on UN (mandated) peace operations, see LEUVEN MANUAL ON
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO PEACE OPERATIONS (T.D. Gill et al. eds.,
2017).
32. The Secretary General’s Bulletin on the Observance of Humanitarian Law, U.N.
Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), is an internal UN guideline which sets out UN
policy on applying IHL in the context of peace operations. It does not preclude or in any
way affect the applicability of IHL to the UN as a matter of law.
33. See, e.g., LEUVEN MANUAL, supra note 31, r. 6.1 (with commentary).
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On the one hand, the UN has remained reluctant to openly admit it has
become a party to an armed conflict, except on rare occasions, even when it
is clear to an impartial observer that it has in fact become a party. On the
other hand, the ICRC has taken the position that a multinational force can
not only become a party to an ongoing NIAC through meeting the intensity
of force threshold, but also through other forms of support to the host nation. In that context, the ICRC has adopted what it refers to as the “supportbased approach” to lower the threshold of applicability of IHL in situations
where a multinational force providing support to a host State can become a
party to an ongoing non-international armed conflict by engaging in actions
not necessarily involving the use of force, but instead through providing logistical or various other forms of “non-kinetic” support to a host State that
is party to such a conflict. 34 The basic rationale behind the SBA is to make
what the ICRC refers to as a “level playing field” by ensuring that the multinational force cannot hide behind its protected status. The multinational
force becomes subject to IHL as soon as it engages in more than incidental
use of force or takes actions related to the conflict in support of a government engaged in an ongoing NIAC. The ICRC sees this as a consequence of
the principle of belligerent equality to ensure that the parties to an armed
conflict are subject to the same obligations and implicitly at least can engage
in attacks on the adversary on the basis of the IHL rules governing the conduct of hostilities. The ICRC even takes the position that the forms of support which can trigger the applicability of IHL to the multinational force
providing support to a government can widen the geographical scope of the
conflict to include the territory of the TCCs, unless the multinational force
is under the control of the UN and as a sub-organ of the Security Council
would have an autonomous legal personality making it, and not the UN as a
whole or the TCCs, party to the conflict. 35
While it may seem logical and fair to apply IHL equally to any entity
which provides support of a nature to affect an ongoing conflict, the SBA

34. The “support-based approach” is ICRC policy first set out in Tristan Ferraro, The
Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces, 95 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 561 (2013), and later adopted by the ICRC and
elaborated by the same author in The ICRC’s Legal Position on the Notion of Armed Conflict
Involving Foreign Intervention and on Determining the IHL Applicable in This Type of Conflict, 97
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1227 (2015).
35. Ferraro, The Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces, supra note 34, at 568–70 (belligerent equality), 608–11(geographical scope).
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raises a number of issues and problems that, on balance, outweigh any purported “benefits” it is intended to promote. Firstly, the SBA is a more or less
tailor-made concept that only applies to one specific type of actor in one
specific type of scenario within a NIAC. The original concept of the SBA
put forward by Tristan Ferraro was that it was designed for multinational
(peacekeeping) forces providing support to a host State engaged in an ongoing NIAC with one or more armed groups. The ICRC position is that it
applies to any situation where a State or organization is providing support
above the level of training or material support (provision of equipment and
the like) but including actions in support of a party to an ongoing NIAC,
ranging from direct engagement in combat to logistical and other forms of
support that have an impact on the conflict and are in support of one of the
parties. Nonetheless, it is clear that the ICRC position only covers the situation whereby one or more States, usually acting through an international organization, provide assistance to a host State government engaged in an ongoing NIAC. In short, to the type of situations the original concept was designed to address, including refueling aircraft, provision of intelligence for
purposes of target identification, and logistical support of forces engaged in
an armed conflict. 36 Needless to say, these types of support are not the types
of support normally provided or capable of being provided by non-State actors. This raises the question: why design an approach that only really fits
one type of actor and one type of situation? Which equality does this serve?
Secondly, it seems redundant to include direct combat support or other
acts constituting “direct participation in hostilities” (DPH) as one of the
types of support which fit in the SBA and would cause the entity providing
such support to become a party to an ongoing conflict. It is settled law that
if a State or other entity provides sustained support to a party in an ongoing
conflict amounting to DPH on more than an incidental basis this will cause
it to become a party to the conflict, assuming it has the requisite degree of
organization. If the support is sporadic and does not form a pattern of continuous direct participation, it would be more logical to view it as an incidence of DPH causing a temporary loss of protection from attack for the
duration of the direct participation. While some aspects of DPH are still not
completely settled, both the ICRC and most individuals who have voiced
36. In Ferraro, The ICRC’s Legal Position on the Notion of Armed Conflict Involving Foreign
Intervention and on Determining the IHL Applicable in This Type of Conflict, supra note 34, the term
“foreign intervention by third parties” is repeatedly used, indicating a wider application than
UN (mandated) peace operations and covering States, coalitions of States, and international
(regional) organizations of various types. See, e.g., id. at 1230.
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critique of certain aspects its Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities agree that an incidental participation in hostilities by civilians does not
automatically result in permanent loss of protection (multinational peacekeeping forces are “civilians” for the purposes of application of IHL until
such time as they become a party to a conflict). They would also agree that
if DPH is sustained and occurs on a regular basis in a NIAC, then the persons, group, or entity concerned will lose protection and become a party to
the conflict, regardless of the form that the DPH takes. 37 This would include
many of the activities named in the SBA such as provision of logistical support in an area where combat is occurring, provision of intelligence directly
related to targeting, or refueling of aircraft directly engaged in combat, alongside the obvious candidate of direct fire support. Hence, the SBA is redundant where it restates accepted law and illogical where it contradicts the
ICRC’s own position, alongside that of most other observers, to the extent
it would permanently remove protection as a consequence of incidental acts
amounting to DPH. To the extent it would apply to forms of support not
amounting to DPH, it would be lowering the bar of becoming party to a
conflict beyond anything presently accepted as law.
Thirdly, the SBA does not provide any additional or enhanced protection
to civilians. How would making a multinational force engaging in various
forms of support to a host State lose its protection from attack in any way
provide additional protection to civilians beyond the degree that civilians already have under IHL? That makes no sense. Nor does making various
forms of non-kinetic support to a party to a conflict a trigger for becoming
party to an ongoing NIAC in any way enhance accountability, as is sometimes argued. On the other hand, removing the protected status of civilians
37. The ICRC guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities is clear on
the issue of temporary loss of protection of civilians, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION
IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 70 (2009). On the other
hand, during a NIAC members of an armed group with an ongoing combat function are
subject to continuous loss of protection for as long as they are members of the armed group.
By analogy this would include the military component of a peace support mission. So, by
analogy, one or more members of a UN (mandated) multinational operation who directly
participated in an act constituting DPH would be subject to temporary loss of protection
from attack for the duration of their participation. If the force as a whole engaged in sustained acts amounting to DPH, it would become a party to the conflict and the military
members of the force would be subject to attack for the duration of the conflict or until
such time as the force disengaged from direct support. Any other reading would result in an
unequal application of the DPH criteria to members of multinational operations.
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means that an entire group of persons not otherwise subject to attack become so, which would be likely to expand the scope of the conflict rather
than limit it. If that expansion were to apply to the territory of any State
providing troops to a multinational peace support operation, it would extend
the geographical application of IHL well beyond the normal confines of
where IHL is applicable in a NIAC. Geography of armed conflict, particularly in NIAC, is a complex issue involving more than simply where IHL
might or might not apply, but providing for potentially global application of
IHL on the basis of various types of non-kinetic support to a host State
government in the context of a multinational peace support operation does
not in any way enhance protection of civilians, although it would potentially
have the effect of exporting hostilities to a whole range of countries far removed from a conflict. Finally, even assuming that the principle of belligerent equality applies in the context of NIAC, which is not as self-evident as
the authors of the SBA maintain, it does not have anything to do with the
applicability of IHL ratione personae or ratione loci. Rather, it deals with the equal
application of the obligations arising under IHL to all parties to a conflict,
irrespective of the legality of recourse to force by one side or the other in
the ad bellum context. Consequently, there is no role for it as a justification
for the SBA. Moreover, the SBA has no basis in law, either in any international treaty or as a matter of customary law. In fact, most States and international organizations reject it. In sum, the SBA is neither binding law, nor
good policy, for the reasons set out above. Instead, it makes much more
sense to reemphasize that the criteria for becoming party to a NIAC—either
as a result of the organization and intensity requirements being met or as a
consequence of an actor engaging in actions constituting direct participation
in hostilities in support of one party to an ongoing NIAC to the detriment
of another on a reasonably sustained basis—are exactly the same for all relevant actors and for any type of non-international armed conflict. 38

38. I have set out these arguments in a blog post in response to comments in general
support of the ICRC SBA by Raphaël van Steenberghe & Pauline Lesaffre, The ICRC’s “Support-Based Approach”: A Suitable But Incomplete Theory, QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(May 31, 2019), http://www.qil-qdi.org/the-icrcs-support-based-approach-a-suitable-butincomplete-theory/. For my reply, see Some Thoughts on the ICRC Support Based Approach,
QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (May 31, 2019), http://www.qil-qdi.org/somethoughts-on-the-icrc-support-based-approach/.
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SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have attempted in this short contribution to stimulate critical reflection on
the threshold for the existence of an international armed conflict, the application of rules of IHL in any type of conflict to accord with the intensity,
duration, and scope of the conflict on a sort of sliding scale in which, without
sacrificing the protective function of IHL, its application to the conduct of
hostilities is linked to the scale, intensity, and organization of the contending
parties and overall scope of the conflict. I have also argued that application
of IHL rules relating to the conduct of hostilities should take account of
other relevant bodies of law, including both ad bellum considerations of necessity and proportionality in international armed conflicts, and, in relation
to armed incidents below the proposed higher threshold for the existence of
an international armed conflict, of human rights law. I have also given some
reasons why I think it is not realistic to, on the one hand expand the number
of customary IHL rules applicable in any NIAC to approximate the density
of regulation of hostilities applicable in international armed conflicts, while
at the same time lowering the threshold for NIAC to the point where it is
barely distinguishable from large scale violent civil unrest or organized criminal activity. I have provided some suggestions on matching the level of regulation of hostilities to the intensity and capabilities of all respective parties.
Finally, I have offered some reasons why I feel that the ICRC’s “supportbased approach” should be rejected and argued instead that the question of
when IHL applies to multinational operations should be resolved on the basis of the exact same criteria as apply to any actor in any type of conflict.
While some of the proposals put forward are to some extent innovative, they
are not, by any means, completely new or wholly original, nor are they intended to offer a ready-made solution to all of the problems arising in the
grey areas of the law of armed conflict. But if this essay succeeds in stimulating discussion and perhaps some reassessment of some points too often
accepted as “home truths” without further consideration of whether they are
as self-evident as is often taken for granted, I will consider it as having fulfilled its purpose.
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